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COLLOQUIUM
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AN ERA
OF CONTRACTING CIVIL LIABILITY
FOREWORD
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
On October 27, 2017, the Stein Center for Law and Ethics in conjunction
with the Fordham Law Review hosted a Colloquium entitled Access to Justice
and the Legal Profession in an Era of Contracting Civil Liability. This issue
of the Fordham Law Review publishes the articles prepared for that
Colloquium. Traversing tort reform, constitutional rights, federal courts,
civil procedure, and legal ethics, the small Colloquium was cross-disciplinary
with a vengeance. Happily, these contributions from scholars around the
country have now coalesced into a coherent whole.
Although the Colloquium topic is not part of the access-to-justice
movement as usually defined, it makes sense to say a few words in advance
about access to justice because contracting civil liability is a complementary
theme and, indeed, because the National Center for Access to Justice has
recently joined Fordham Law School (and thus provided further impetus for
exploring this critically important area).1 For the most art, the access-tojustice movement identifies the formal and informal barriers ordinary people
must surmount in order to enforce their rights effectively and to be duly
protected from civil and criminal liability.2 Lawyers, funding, information,
evidence, physical access, legal aid asymmetries in representation—these are
only the beginnings of the host of challenges most individuals face, barriers
that have an especially marked impact for the poorest in our society. As
substantive legal rights, powers, and protections expanded in the 1960s and
* James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics and Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law. I am grateful to Fordham Law School, the Stein Center for Law and Ethics,
Professor Bruce Green, and the Fordham Law Review for making this Colloquium possible.
Amanda Gottlieb, David Marcus, Russell Pearce, David Udell, and Amy Widmar deserve
special thanks for their thoughtfulness and flexibility.
1. See Relationship to Fordham Law School and Other Law Schools, NAT’L CTR. FOR
ACCESS TO JUST., http://ncforaj.org/about-2/our-partnership-with-fordham/ [https://perma.cc/
9RBV-VKUQ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
2. David Udell, The Civil Legal Aid Movement: 15 Initiatives That Are Increasing
Access to Justice in the United States, IMPACT, Apr. 2016, at 73, 73.
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1970s, profound limitations in the means to access to those rights became
even clearer. To its enormous credit, the access-to-justice movement has
begun to mobilize lawyers and judges. There is an increasing recognition
that our special privileges as members of the bar and bench come with a
responsibility to see to it that the legal system is serving society’s members
tolerably well and to repair it where it is broken. It is therefore both
appropriate and, now, unsurprising to see access-to-justice concerns as part
of the academic field of professional responsibility and legal ethics.
As Professor David Marcus’s superb history of the federal class action
displays, the spirit of proactive litigation expansion in the 1950s through the
1970s3 was largely supplanted in the 1980s and 1990s (and into the present
day) by an opposite set of forces—forces of contraction.4 Professor Marcus’s
account of the transition from the period of expansion to the period of
contraction was part of this Colloquium and was published as a freestanding
article in the March 2018 issue of the Fordham Law Review.5
The contraction of civil liability is connected with, but in at least one
respect more disturbing than, the diminution in access to justice; it arguably
marks a decline in our enthusiasm for justice itself. It would be one thing if
our legal system’s proclivity to restrain and punish individuals were cut back.
Alas, that is not the case. Our Colloquium participants here suggest an
asymmetry in the direction of legal change; there is a marked diminution of
legal powers of the relatively powerless to hold the powerful accountable for
violations of the law. While academic literature on access-to-justice contains
much that relates to professional responsibility and legal ethics, professional
responsibility and legal ethics have not figured prominently in the academic
literature on contracting civil liability. Yet the fact that civil liability is
contracting is surely a proper topic of concern for the bench and the bar, just
like access to justice more conventionally understood. We are not talking
about substantive rights and protections—we are talking about whether those
who would wish to exercise and vindicate those rights will, as a practical
matter, be able to do so.
Professor Maria Glover’s “‘Encroachments and Oppressions’: The
Corporatization of Procedure and the Decline of Rule of Law” begins our
issue with a devastating overview of the procedural changes in federal law
that have dramatically strengthened the hand of corporate America in civil
litigation—heightening of pleading standards, restrictions on class actions,
and shearing away of personal jurisdiction are principal examples of a much
broader phenomenon.6
If Professor Glover’s article provides the grand overview at a federal level,
Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom’s “The Diminished Trial” brings us right
3. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2013).
4. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part II: Litigation and
Legitimacy, 1981–1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1797–1801 (2018).
5. See id. at 1785.
6. J. Maria Glover, “Encroachments and Oppressions”: The Corporatization of
Procedure and the Decline of Rule of Law, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2113 (2018).
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down to earth at the level of the particular case and the particular trial. While
several scholars in recent years have documented the extraordinary
diminution in the number of civil trials that occur, both in federal and state
courts, Professor Engstrom shows that the trials themselves have become
much shorter and heavily constricted.7 The point is that today’s judiciary
employs more than great pressure to settle, which creates grounds for worry
that a civil plaintiff will effectively be shut down in his or her effort to hold
a defendant accountable. Even if there is a trial, it will be very possibly
structured in a manner that squeezes out the plaintiff’s power and diminishes
the procedures set forth to ensure a fair trial.8
Three of those participating in the Colloquium—Professor Jules Lobel,
Professor Alexander Reinert, and I—took the U.S. Supreme Court’s June
2017 decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi9 as a (regrettable) occasion to mark the
atrophy of federal civil rights actions flowing from Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.10 Fordham Law School was
fortunate to have, in Professors Lobel and Reinert, two of the lawyers
intimately involved in the post-9/11 Bivens litigation, including Ziglar and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.11 The plaintiffs in Ziglar were (primarily) Muslim men
wrongfully imprisoned pursuant to explicit religious and ethnic profiling
after 9/11.12 Professor Lobel explains in “Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Demise
of Accountability” how anomalous the Supreme Court’s denial of a Bivens
claim was in Ziglar.13 This is so especially in light of the Court’s quite
activist stance in the post-9/11 case Boumediene v. Bush.14 While Professor
Lobel’s article emphasizes the role Bivens actions have played in public
accountability, my own short contribution—“Ziglar v. Abbasi and the
Decline of the Right to Redress”—ties Justice Kennedy’s constricted view of
Bivens to a range of other developments that display our legal system’s
diminishing respect for the principle ubi jus, ibi remedium: where there’s a
right there’s a remedy.15
In a remarkably thoughtful article also stemming in part from Ziglar—
“The Influence of Government Defenders on Affirmative Civil Rights
Enforcement”—Professor Reinert discusses the twin roles of the federal
government in civil rights litigation (sometimes plaintiff/civil rights enforcer,

7. Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Diminished Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131, 2134–37
(2018).
8. Id. at 2146–47 (noting that reforms such as the “increased granting of motions for
partial summary judgment, increased pretrial activity, reduction in the size of the civil jury,
increased bifurcation, imposition of time restrictions on opening statements and closing
arguments, and imposition of across-the-board trial time limits” can shrink trials).
9. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
10. 403 U.S. 388 (1999).
11. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
12. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1853.
13. Jules Lobel, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Demise of Accountability, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
2149, 2151 (2018).
14. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
15. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Decline of the Right to Redress, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2167, 2168 (2018).
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sometimes defendant/government-actor protector).16 Notwithstanding the
common assumption of a left/right divide on civil rights at the Supreme
Court, Professor Reinert notes that the Obama administration’s lawyers at the
Supreme Court were even more aggressive in rejecting accountability than
their Bush administration predecessors.17
In a welcome turn, several of our participants painted a more mixed
picture, or at least suggested strategies for protecting the powerless in an era
of contracting liability.
Professor Michael L. Wells’s “Wrongful
Convictions, Constitutional Remedies, and Nelson v. Colorado” focuses on
a case in which a majority of the Justices held unconstitutional a Colorado
law concerning funds that a criminal defendant had been required to pay the
state after being convicted.18 Colorado law permitted the state to retain these
funds even after a defendant’s conviction was overturned and the defendant
was exonerated. Although Professor Wells’s own central point was to
indicate today’s unfortunately muddled “property” jurisprudence under the
Fourteenth Amendment, he saw another path to the same decision, and in any
event showed that the 2017 Court was still willing to enforce fundamental
rule-of-law values in a case involving an especially vulnerable litigant.19
In “The Politics of Access: Examining Concerted State/Private
Enforcement Solutions to Class Action Bans,” Professor Myriam Gilles
explores the politics of regaining citizens’ rights to aggregate litigation in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion,20 which broadly endorsed class-ban provisions.21 Once class
actions are off the table for violations of state consumer rights statutes,
liability is unlikely because of the low stakes. In a sweeping yet incisive
survey, Professor Gilles suggests that state parens patriae, private attorney
general qui tam statutes, and state attorney general proceedings with
collateral estoppel effect would leverage the standing of public officials to
escape the harmful effects of Concepcion.22
The integrity of the trial process has ardent defenders in Professors Suja
Thomas and Jeffrey Stempel. Professor Thomas’s “Reforming the Summary
Judgment Problem: The Consensus Requirement” provides a powerful
critique of judicial trends to circumvent the jury trial, including the
aggressive granting of summary judgment motions.23 Constructively
commenting on what has been a controversial issue since the Supreme
Court’s Celotex trilogy decades ago, Professor Thomas provocatively
16. Alexander A. Reinert, The Influence of Government Defenders on Affirmative Civil
Rights Enforcement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2181, 2187–88 (2018).
17. Id. at 2185.
18. Michael L. Wells, Wrongful Convictions, Constitutional Remedies, and Nelson v.
Colorado, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2199, 2200 (2018).
19. Id. at 2200–01, 2218–19.
20. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
21. Myriam Gilles, The Politics of Access: Examining Concerted State/Private
Enforcement Solutions to Class Action Bans, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2223, 2231 (2018).
22. Id. at 2239.
23. Suja A. Thomas, Reforming the Summary Judgment Problem: The Consensus
Requirement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2242 (2018).
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proposes that federal appellate panels not permit summary judgment without
panel unanimity.24
A similarly constructive proposal is presented by Professor Stempel in his
article “Judicial Peremptory Challenges as Access Enhancers.”25 Alert to the
possibility of trial judges whom litigants would plausibly view as shutting
down their prospects at the outset of litigation, Professor Stempel suggests
that each litigant be permitted one peremptory challenge of an assigned trial
judge.26 Far from being a novelty, judicial peremptory challenges have been
in place in seventeen states for the past several decades, he notes.27 Professor
Stempel provides an array of reasons for thinking that a much broader range
of states would benefit by introduction of this procedure.
Finally, and by way of acknowledging the necessity of challenging our
own dogmas, the Colloquium concludes with Professor Rebecca Aviel’s fine
article acknowledging the real benefits of litigation reform to those seeking
access to some important parts of our legal system.28 In “Family Law and
the New Access to Justice,” Professor Aviel documents the substantial value
that litigation reform has provided in the family law context. It is not just
that cost, time, and judicial resources have often been spared—justice,
access, and desirable outcomes for litigants’ lives have often benefited from
relaxation of some traditional aspects of the legal process.29 Her article
reminds us that the fact of legal reform itself is hardly the problem. The
question—a question this Colloquium addresses in a time of much legal
turmoil—is how to engage in legal reform that enhances rather than constricts
litigants’ access to justice.

24. Id. at 2260–63.
25. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Judicial Peremptory Challenges as Access Enhancers, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2263, 2265 (2018).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Rebecca Aviel, Family Law and the New Access to Justice, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279,
2279–80 (2018).
29. Id. at 2295–98.

